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Abstract
Existing studies ﬁnd little connection between living standards and
mortality in England, but go back only to the sixteenth century. Us-
ing new data on inheritances, we extend estimates of mortality back to
the mid-thirteenth century and ﬁnd, by contrast, that deaths from unfree
tenants to the nobility were strongly aﬀected by harvests. Looking at a
large sample of parishes after 1540, we ﬁnd that the positive check had
weakened considerably by 1650 even though real wages were falling, but
persisted in London for another century despite its higher wages. In both
cases the disappearance of the positive check coincided with the introduc-
tion of systematic poor relief, suggesting that government action played
a role in breaking the link between harvest failure and mass mortality.
JEL Classiﬁcation: N33
1 Introduction.
While the Malthusian model underpins our understanding of pre-industrial de-
velopment, its empirical performance is unimpressive, particularly when it comes
to the prediction that mortality should rise as living standards fall. In England,
where reliable population estimates go back to the mid-sixteenth century, bad
harvests increased deaths until the mid-seventeenth century, but their impact
then vanishes. Although well known, the weakness of the positive check has
attracted little notice: the assumption appears to be that England in the sev-
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1enteenth and eighteenth centuries was simply too prosperous a place for food
prices to be a matter of life and death.
However, while average living standards in England were high by contem-
porary standards, a substantial fraction of the population nonetheless lived in
deep poverty. Gregory King, in 1688, estimated that one ﬁfth of England’s
population had annual incomes of £2, placing them at the edge of biological
survival (Lindert and Williamson, 1982). In an era when annual rises in wheat
prices of 20 per cent were not unusual, it is hard to see how bad harvests would
not have been followed by marked rises in mortality.
To understand how living standards aﬀected mortality, we begin by extend-
ing estimates of mortality back to the late middle ages. Where existing studies
start in the mid-sixteenth century, we go back three hundred years earlier to the
thirteenth century. Direct records of deaths from this time do not exist, but we
can infer mortality among nobles and unfree tenants (“serfs”) from records of
property transfers.
Our results are striking: in the eighty years before the Black Death in late
1348, poor harvests were deadly at both ends of society, with tenants dying
immediately and nobles with a lag of a year, but showing similar increases to
tenants.
While mortality after 1540 has been intensively analyzed, all existing stud-
ies rely on one data set: the aggregate population estimates of Wrigley and
Schoﬁeld (1981). Here, instead, we analyze the hitherto unused raw data from
404 parishes from which Wrigley and Schoﬁeld derived their national estimates.
Besides reducing standard errors by a factor of twenty compared with aggregate
data, this allows us to see how the positive check varied across regions.
We ﬁnd that the positive check eﬀectively disappeared between the late
sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries (see Figure 6) despite a fall in real
wages of around one third (see Figure 3). However, the positive check did
return temporarily but strongly during the early eighteenth century, and some
parishes continued to experience a signiﬁcant positive check until 1800. We also
examine mortality in London and ﬁnd that a strong positive check persisted
there until the mid-eighteenth century, despite real wages that were more than
ﬁfty per cent above the rest of England; while deaths in Paris continued to move
in line with real wages until the Revolution.
Our ﬁndings raise two issues for Malthusian models. First, how could me-
dieval nobles have been aﬀected by food shortages among the peasantry? Sec-
ondly, what caused the positive check to fall sharply between the mid-sixteenth
2and mid-seventeenth centuries even though real wages were falling; and why did
London continue to sustain a strong positive check for another century despite
its higher wages? To answer these questions, we ﬁrst must understand how the
positive check operated.
In the standard Malthusian cross diagram (see Clark, 2007a for a lucid expo-
sition) a fall in living standards increases mortality; but there is little discussion
of what exactly it is that causes deaths to rise. The assumption appears to be
that the poor fade away through starvation. However, it is only with improved
public health in the twentieth century that people began literally to starve to
death: before this most famine victims succumbed to epidemic disease (Mokyr
and Ó Gráda 2002, Ó Gráda 2007).
That epidemics followed poor harvests was not simply because of hunger—
the connection between nutritional status and immune functioning is not straight-
forward, with malnourishment increasing susceptibility to some diseases but not
others (Chandra, 1996)—but to the interaction between malnutrition and va-
grancy. As hungry people took to the roads in search of work or charity, the
combination of malnutrition, poor hygiene, exposure to the elements, and psy-
chological stress turned them into both victims and vectors of contagious disease.
As a result, while mortality of the very poorest rose immediately after a poor
harvest (a pattern we ﬁnd among medieval tenants and in ancien regime Paris),
the main impact occurred one or two years later as epidemic illness spread
through the general population.
With bad harvests leading to vagrancy, disease, and social disorder, gov-
ernments had a clear incentive to ameliorate their impact, but the only state
suﬃciently well organized to act decisively was England. Historians divide En-
glish eﬀorts at poor relief into two broad stages: a reliance on interventions in
grain markets from the late sixteenth century, supplemented by municipal relief
in larger cities and extensive private charity; followed by a national system of
parish poor rates that appeared in the 1620s and endured for two hundred years
(Walter 1989, Leonard 1900).
Against the existing view of pre-industrial economies as passive victims of
iron Malthusian processes, it would appear instead that societies not only had
the incentive, but sometimes also the ability, to mitigate the positive check
through public and private charity. In other words, living standards were not
the sole determinant of mortality: well designed institutions could also matter.
As Sen (1981) has argued, starvation is as much a matter of politics as of food
supply. In the medieval period there was little extra charitable assistance to cope
3with crises, and poor harvests caused heavy mortality at all levels of society.
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, increased provision of
charity softened the impact of bad harvests; and after 1650 local poor relief and
quarantining of infected families were suﬃcient (usually: we shall see that the
system broke down twice in the early eighteenth century) to prevent episodes
of dearth transforming into national epidemics.
That the positive check endured in London for a century after it had largely
vanished in poorer rural areas is consistent with the looser organization of its
public charity, and the tendency of the poor to migrate there in search of work
after poor harvests. Again, the disappearance of the positive check in London
coincides with the development of systematic public charity there.
Existing literature.
This paper draws together three literatures that have existed almost indepen-
dently of each other: those on living standards and population growth after the
sixteenth century; on medieval mortality; and on the evolution of the English
Poor Law. The monumental reconstruction of English population after 1541
from parish records by Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) allowed the interaction of
living standards and population to be studied in detail. Beginning with Wrigley
and Schoﬁeld (1981, 412–417) and Lee (1981), and continuing to Lee and An-
derson (2002) who survey the intervening literature, no study ﬁnds evidence of
a substantial positive check after the mid-seventeenth century. However, what
is notable about these all these studies is that they do not go on to ask why the
positive check diminished, and whether state intervention had anything to do
with this.
Death rates in medieval England have been studied by Razi (1980) and
Ecclestone (1999) for the fourteenth century; and by Gottfried (1978), Hatcher
(1986), and Hatcher, Piper and Stone (2006) for the ﬁfteenth. However, these
studies only describe the pattern of mortality, and do not examine its possible
connection with living standards. The classic exception is Postan and Titow
(1959) who looked at the relationship between harvests and mortality on ﬁve
Winchester manors, but their use of heriots (where the lord took a dead tenant’s
best beast) as a proxy for mortality remains controversial: see Nightingale (2005,
40–43).
Classic histories of the English Poor Law are Leonard (1900) and Slack
(1989). Although the concern of most recent historical study, surveyed by Hindle
4(2004), is with the micro-politics of the Poor Law, there is increasing interest
in its eﬀectiveness, as shown by Smith (2008). Most economic historians focus
on the late eighteenth century and after (for example Boyer, 1989 and Lindert,
2006); but two notable exceptions that look at the evolution and eﬀectiveness
of early poor relief are Walter (1989) and Solar (1995), while Post (1976) argues
that variations in European death rates can be explained by diﬀerent levels of
public charity, and Fogel (1992) links the absence of English mortality crises
after the sixteenth century with the development of public charity.
However, the ﬁrst author to share our reservations about the crude Malthu-
sian model was Thomas Malthus (1800). In An Investigation of the Cause of
the Present High Price of Provisions, Malthus was struck by how poor harvests
across northern Europe in 1799 had caused near famine in Scandinavia, but
no more than hardship in England. With notable intellectual honesty, Malthus
conceded that “The system of the poor laws, in general, I certainly do most
heartily condemn, as I have expressed in another place, but I am inclined to
think that their operation in the present scarcity has been advantageous to the
country.”
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows similar patterns of
mortality among tenants and nobles in the eighty years before the Black Death,
while Section 3 ﬁnds that this mortality is strongly predicted by real wages. To
contrast our medieval results with the intensively studied period after the mid-
sixteenth century, Section 4 shows how the positive check waned steadily despite
falling real wages from the late sixteenth century, but with a strong upsurge
during the early eighteenth century. In London, by contrast, the positive check
remained strong and constant until the mid-eighteenth century, and it persisted
in Paris until the Revolution. Section 5 suggests that the weakening impact of
harvests on mortality was due to the creation of a national system of poor relief
from the 1620s, and its extension to London from the 1720s, and investigates
how the strength of the positive check related to local conditions.
2 Mortality before the Black Death: Tenants
and Nobles.
In this section we use records of property transfers before the Black Death to
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Figure 1: Annual deaths among nobles and tenants, 1270–1349.
2.1 Mortality among tenants.
On medieval estates, unfree tenants had to pay a ﬁne at the manorial court
to transfer tenancy of land, and the records of these payments survive in large
numbers. A typical account roll entry, for 1325, translates “And for 30 shillings
from Isabella, who was Roger’s le Muleward wife, to retain one messuage and
half-virgate of land [i.e. a cottage and about 20 acres] in Downton which be-
longed to the said Roger her husband” (Titow, 1969, p. 123). The more than
12,000 ﬁnes paid on each manor of the large estates of the Bishops of Winch-
ester in the south of England between 1263 and the arrival of the Black Death
in 1349 have been compiled by Page (2003), who was interested in the growth
of land transfers between unrelated individuals as evidence of the emergence of
a peasant land market. By counting the annual number of these transfers that
Page lists as inheritances, we can see how strongly deaths responded to living
standards.1
We have records of 12,378 inheritances on 77 manors whose annual totals
are plotted in Figure 1. Gaps occur in years when there was no bishop. The
accounting year started after the harvest, on 29 September (Michaelmas), and
manorial courts where ﬁnes were paid usually met only a few times a year, so
1By measuring mortality directly by inheritances, we avoid the potential problem with
heriots encountered by Postan and Titow (1959).
6some of the inheritances recorded correspond to deaths in the previous calendar
year. The number of inheritances shows two spikes where we would expect
them: in 1317, at the peak of the Great Famine; and in 1349, the ﬁrst year of
the Black Death. Inheritances do not show a trend, suggesting that the relevant
population of tenants was approximately constant, although total population
probably fell by around 10 per cent during the Great Famine (Kershaw, 1973).
We can gauge the approximate social level of the dead by entry ﬁnes their
heirs paid. To be a middling farmer required about a half-virgate of land which,
in the early fourteenth century, commanded an entry ﬁne of at least 30 to
40 shillings, and considerably more on some manors. This corresponds to the
largest 10 to 15 per cent of ﬁnes in most years in our sample, where the median
ﬁne after 1300 is 7.5 shillings. Titow (1969, 78–81) estimates that only about
half of all tenants in the early fourteenth century owned more than a quarter
virgate, the minimum for subsistence. In other words, most tenants in our
sample were smallholders, many with too little land to support themselves and
having to work for wealthier farmers.
The manors in our sample vary considerably by number of tenants, and in
the continuity of their records. The 20 largest manors account for roughly 70
per cent of recorded inheritances before 1349; and these large manors provide
almost continuous records. Only fragmentary records survive, by contrast, for
smaller manors. For all manors there are three problematic periods of data.
While most large manors in most years always report some inheritances, before
1269 most large manors report none: there is clearly under-registration (Kelly
and Ó Gráda 2010 ﬁnd that recorded harvest yields before 1269 are similarly
unreliable). The same clear under-registration occurs in 1323, a year in the
middle of a 4 year break in records when many larger manors do not furnish
returns; and to a lesser extent in 1305.
2.2 Mortality before the Black Death: Nobles.
The English nobility were, by deﬁnition, direct tenants of the king, and when
a noble died without children, or those children were minors, their land was
supposed to revert to the crown. To determine the value of the property and
the existence of possible heirs, an Inquisition Post Mortem was carried out
within weeks of the death, usually by neighbouring nobles. The records of all
1,819 surviving Inquisitions from 1300 to 1349 were used by Campbell (2005)
to assess the income of the English nobility, and we use his numbers here as a
7proxy for annual deaths among the nobility.2 Again, because we are looking at
a tenurial series, the number of nobles will remain reasonably constant even if
population falls, so death rates will move in line with numbers of deaths if the
series is accurate.
This proxy has the potential for under-counting: reversion of land to the
crown was eﬀectively a tax on the most powerful and potentially dangerous
elements of society, and its collection relied on the cooperation of the local
nobility. It is possible that in periods of weak central authority, such as the
reign of Edward II (1302–1327), numbers of IPMs may underestimate deaths of
nobles without adult heirs.
Figure 1 plots the numbers of inquisitions each year. Immediately apparent
is the absence of a spike at the peak of the Great Famine in 1317, and the
smaller rise in deaths among nobles compared with tenants in 1349, suggesting
under-registration during mortality crises.
2.3 Death the Leveller.
We have independent data on deaths at opposite ends of society: the rich, and
the, mostly, poor. Our expectation was that the two series would be weakly
correlated because of measurement error in each; and because of the diﬀerent
mortality experiences in the two groups. In fact, they turn out to be closely
correlated.
As Figure 2 shows, peasant mortality on the largest 20 manors, measured
by inheritance ﬁnes, moves in line with mortality of nobles, measured by IPMs,
with the exception of two years where we already suspect under-counting: 1317
for nobles, and 1305 for tenants.
This correlation between two mortality series constructed in quite diﬀer-
ent ways suggests three things. First, that both series are reasonably accurate
measures of deaths, without severe under-registration in most years. Secondly,
given that deaths of nobles were recorded within weeks, the correlation with
tenant deaths suggests that most entry ﬁnes were paid soon after the death of
a tenant, rather than in the following accounting year. Finally, and most im-
portantly, that nobles were dying at similar rates to tenants is unexpected, and
suggests that epidemic disease was a major factor in mortality. Hollingsworth’s
(1975) famous ﬁnding that English peers in the late fourteenth and ﬁfteenth cen-
2Nash (1980) reports the number of IPMs for Wiltshire from 1242–1377, but the annual
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Figure 2: Annual deaths of nobles versus tenants, 1300–1348.
turies had similar life expectancies to poorer commoners is sometimes cited as
evidence against any connection between living standards and mortality. What
we see instead is that rich and poor are succumbing at similar rates to the same
epidemic diseases.3
What precisely these epidemic diseases were is impossible to say: even the
nature of the Black Death is disputed.4 The mortality among nobles suggests
some form of inﬂuenza, that has been identiﬁed as the main killer during the
last national famine in England in 1556–58 (Hoskins, 1964). We now consider
whether these epidemic outbreaks were exogenous events or the result of harvest
failure.
3 Living Standards and Mortality.
We assume a simple log-linear Malthusian model
ln(Dt/Nt) = β0 + β0
1 ln(wt) + β0
2 ln(Dt−1/Nt−1) + β0
3 ln(Xt) (1)
3Nobles were also at risk of death in battle, but the risk was low at this time: in Rosenthal’s
(1973) sample of peers, fewer than 5 per cent of those born in the early fourteenth century
died violently, compared with one third a century later. The only major battle of this period,
Bannockburn in 1314, does not stand out in Figure 1.
4Cohn (2002) has argued inﬂuentially that the lethality and rapid spread of Black Death










































































































































Figure 3: Real wage of agricultural labourers in England, 1274–1800 (Clark,
2007b) .
where D are annual deaths, N is population, w is a measure of living standards:
either harvest yields or the real wage, and X are other variables, such as tech-
nology, medical knowledge, public charity, and urbanization. The right hand








For our populations of tenants and nobles we assume that ∆N = 0: the
population is roughly constant. This appears consistent with the absence of
trends in Figure 1. For annual diﬀerences, we assume that the impact of changes
in other factors X is negligible: it makes sense for a fall in mortality from one
year to the next to be caused by higher real wages, but not by better technology
or medical knowledge, although these variables can exert a strong inﬂuence over




To measure living standards w we start by looking at harvest yields, and then
consider real wage estimates.
While wheat was the primary commercial grain, oats and barley cost less
per calorie, grew on worse land, and were more resistant to bad weather, oﬀer-
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(b) Nobles, 1300–1348.
Figure 4: Impact of real wages on mortality of nobles and tenants.
count records of what manors fed their servants—outside harvest time when
better food was on oﬀer to attract seasonal workers and to fuel intense physical
exertion— show that the staple food of the poor before the Black Death was
dredge, a mixture of barley and oats (Dyer, 1988). Yields of cheaper spring
grains may therefore be most important in explaining deaths.
However, regressing inheritances on cereal yields, we found little connection
between yields of spring grains and mortality. This probably reﬂects the fact
that many tenants had holdings too small for subsistence, meaning that they
had to work to buy grain; and the price of all grains closely tracked wheat yields
(Kelly and Ó Gráda, 2010). The strongest relation was between wheat yields
and subsequent mortality, but stronger still was the connection with the real
wage series of agricultural labourers of Clark (2007b).
Because we have data for individual manors, we can estimate a multi-level
regression, allowing the impact of wages and past deaths to vary across manors
∆ln(Dt) = (β1 + β1i)0∆ln(wt) + (β2 + β2i)0∆ln(Dt−1) (4)
where the vector of random eﬀects across manors βi = (β0
1i,β0
2i)0 ∼ N(0,Σβi)
(Bates, 2010, 12). However, when estimating this equation, we found that the




lag wage −0.476∗ −0.922∗
(0.241) (0.376)
lag2 wage 0.242 0.073
(0.259) (0.384)
lag3 wage −0.437 −0.417
(0.247) (0.39)
lag deaths −0.447∗∗ −0.633∗∗
(0.032) (0.171)
lag2 deaths −0.272∗∗ −0.092
(0.029) (0.2)













Regression of annual number of deaths on lagged
real wages of agricultural labourers and lagged
deaths. All series are ﬁrst diﬀerences of logs. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Nobles series starts in
1300. * denotes signiﬁcance at 5 per cent, ** at 1
per cent.
Table 1: Eﬀect of real wages on mortality of nobles and tenants, 1269–1348.
at zero: there appears to be little variation in coeﬃcients across manors. We
therefore report ordinary least squares results here.
Figure 4(a) plots lagged real wages against the number of inheritances on
the 20 largest manors, from the ﬁrst reliable year of data in 1269 to the eve of
the Black Death in 1348, leaving out the Great Famine peak in 1317. There are
several outlying observations: the low value in 1318 reﬂects the normal fall in
mortality at the end of a famine after the unhealthy have been culled from the
population; while the years in the top right of the diagram probably correspond
to episodes of exogenous pestilence: heavy mortality despite good harvests.
Table 1 reports the results of a regression of number of inheritances on
each manor on the real wages and inheritances on the same manor in the three
previous years. All series are ﬁrst diﬀerences of logs. We exclude the ﬁrst Black
Death year of 1349 to prevent its mortality induced poor harvest (there were too
few healthy people to harvest standing crops) generating spurious signiﬁcance.
Dummies are added for three years of unusual mortality identiﬁed above: 1269,
121317, and 1342. The wage in each year reﬂects wheat prices which, because
wheat could be stored for a year, reﬂect harvests during the past two years.
It can be seen that real wages exert a substantial immediate impact on mor-
tality, with an elasticity of one half, with a similarly large impact in the following
year. The relatively low population density on these manors (Campbell, 2007)
and their mild climate, means that the impact of bad harvests was probably
lower than in other parts of England, and this elasticity of mortality with re-
spect to real wages of unity is probably close to a lower bound nationally. It can
also be seen that increased mortality in one year is followed by a fall in mortality
of nearly four ﬁfths in the following years: much of the increase in mortality
represents an acceleration of deaths among the elderly or already ill, but over
one ﬁfth represents deaths among otherwise healthy individuals. Among the
outliers in Figure 4(a), only 1289, 1317 and 1342 are signiﬁcant.
If we used average wheat yield (using the annual median of yields in Camp-
bell 2007) to measure living standards instead of real wages, only the ﬁrst lag of
yield is signiﬁcant at conventional levels, but with an elasticity of only −0.37.
Yield varied substantially across manors each year. Using wheat yield on indi-
vidual manors as the measure of their living standards, we did not ﬁnd any large
or signiﬁcant eﬀects. A manor could experience a poor harvest without any im-
pact on mortality, so long as other manors experienced good harvests and prices
remained low: these fourteenth century peasants were not subsistence farmers
but integrated into a market.
The size distribution of ﬁnes allows us also to see if years of severe epidemic
mortality—1317 and 1349—had diﬀerent social distributions of mortality than
ordinary years. After 1303, the median ﬁne is 80 pence, identical to the median
ﬁnes in 1317 and 1349, suggesting that tenants at all levels suﬀered equally
during these crises.
Adding summer and winter temperature as explanatory variables, using the
reconstructions in Kelly and Ó Gráda (2010), to test if weather conditions had
direct eﬀects on mortality, did not produce eﬀects that were substantial or
signiﬁcant.
3.1 Mortality among nobles.
Figure 4(b) shows the relationship between real wages in one year and IPMs the















































































































































Figure 5: Deaths per thousand and the inverse real wage in England; 1541–1810.
of the Great Famine, but 1305 is a puzzling outlier that does not correspond to
any battle or known demographic event.
The second column of Table 1 gives the results of a regression of the annual
number of IPMs on current and lagged real wages and IPMs. None of the
outliers in Figure 4(b) is large or signiﬁcant. It can be seen that the dynamics
of mortality among nobles are somewhat diﬀerent from those among peasants,
with the signiﬁcant impact of a real wage fall occurring with a lag of one year.
An increase in deaths one year is followed by a two thirds fall in deaths the
following year.
That the mortality of the richest group in English society moved in response
to food prices shows that wealth was no armour against death from epidemic dis-
ease that had incubated among hungry peasants. This vulnerability to epidemic
illness is further suggested by Nash’s (1980) Wiltshire data which shows that
nobles died predominantly during the summer months, at the time of greatest
hunger before the new harvest.
What is notable about the results in Table 1 apart from the large coeﬃcients
for both tenants and nobles is the large standard error for both groups, that
reﬂects the high volatility of mortality on individual manors for tenants, and
the small sample size of nobles. While we can conclude that the positive check
before the Black Death was large for both groups, it is not possible to say with
much conﬁdence precisely how large it was. To do this requires much larger
samples, something that we have after 1540.
14wage wage (-1) wage (-2) wage (-3) deaths (-1) deaths (-2) deaths (-3) ˜ R2 loglik N Parishes
1600 −0.1273 −0.2623 −0.5465 −0.2786 −0.5854 −0.3714 −0.2035 0.2876 −6023.2 8563 237
(0.0452) (0.0486) (0.049) (0.0442) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0099)
1650 0.0718 −0.4623 −0.0837 −0.1356 −0.5983 −0.3863 −0.2066 0.2795 −7575.7 13791 297
(0.0385) (0.0371) (0.0376) (0.0387) (0.0083) (0.0091) (0.008)
1700 −0.0549 −0.0832 −0.0515 0.2574 −0.5677 −0.364 −0.2095 0.2767 −6949.9 15353 310
(0.0263) (0.0265) (0.0285) (0.0248) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0079)
1750 −0.1576 −0.4236 −0.5078 −0.39 −0.5974 −0.4017 −0.231 0.3025 −6973.9 15479 310
(0.0368) (0.0433) (0.0378) (0.0382) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0078)
1800 −0.167 0.1261 −0.2058 0.3735 −0.6595 −0.4344 −0.218 0.3241 −5020.5 15488 310
(0.0469) (0.0544) (0.0523) (0.0548) (0.0078) (0.0088) (0.0078)
Mixed eﬀects regressions by half century of annual number of deaths in parishes on lagged deaths and real wages. All series are diﬀerences of logs. ˜ R2 is squared
correlation between actual and ﬁtted values.
Table 2: Eﬀect of real wages on parish mortality by half century.
4 Living Standards and Mortality after 1540.
Having seen the strong positive check at work before the Black Death, we now
consider how living standards aﬀected death rates after the sixteenth century.
We start by looking at mortality across England after 1539, when every parish
was required to keep systematic records of funerals. Where existing studies
exclusively use national data computed by Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), we
look at mortality in the 404 parishes that Wrigley and Schoﬁeld aggregated
to compute their national estimates. This not only makes our standard errors
twenty times smaller than existing studies, but also allows us to see how the
positive check varied with geography and other characteristics of parishes, in
particular their Poor Law spending.
A major omission in Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) is London (whose share of
English population rose from around 8 per cent to 12 per cent between 1650 and
1750, and share of deaths from around 8–10 per cent to 15–20 per cent), where
parish records from before the Great Fire of 1666 do not survive. However, we
have estimates of London deaths after 1640 from the Bills of Mortality that
were compiled by government to monitor plague outbreaks. For comparison, we
also examine death rates for another metropolis close to London: Paris.
4.1 English parishes.
Table 2 looks at the impact of living standards on parish mortality by half-
century, starting with the ﬁrst complete year of observations in 1540. In esti-
mating the Malthusian equation (2) we again assume that the annual impact
of long run factors ∆logX is negligible. In the absence of migration data, we
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Figure 6: Strength of positive check across parishes by half century, 1540–1800.
of 1811.5 However, we do know national population, and if we estimate equation
2 using national data (which gives almost the same coeﬃcients as the average
across individual parishes reported in Table 2), we get almost exactly the same
coeﬃcients for lagged wages and deaths whether we include the ﬁnal population
term or not.
To examine the evolution of the positive check β1, we estimate a multi-level
regression (4) across parishes by half-century intervals from 1540 to 1800. In the
absence of long run data on regional prices, we use national averages of prices.
Some parishes in the sample are small (37 had a median of ﬁve or fewer funerals
per year over the estimation period), leading to large percentage variations in
annual deaths which caused some convergence problems, especially during the
ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century. We therefore focus on the 310 parishes with
a median number of deaths each year of at least 10.
Including random eﬀects for lagged mortality again led to convergence prob-
lems for the early eighteenth century. For other periods, setting this random
eﬀect to zero (assuming, in other words, the same impact of lagged mortality
in every parish) did not change the ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients β1 and β2 materi-
5If we use natural increase to estimate parish populations backward from 1811, assuming
no migration between parishes, we ﬁnd that a large proportion of parishes have negative
population by 1600.
16ally. Table 2 therefore reports regression results assuming the random eﬀect on
lagged mortality is zero.
We can see that before 1750, the main impact of falling living standards on
mortality occurs after one, and especially, two years. Figure 6 plots for each
parish minus the sum of the wage elasticity of mortality for these two years. It
can be seen immediately that the strength of the positive check diminishes from
1540 to 1700, despite a declining trend in real wages.
This decline of the positive check, however, is sharply reversed in the ﬁrst
half of the eighteenth century which experienced two sharp mortality crises, in
the early 1740s and, especially, the late 1720s when, as Figure 5 shows, death
rates rose to levels not seen since the late 1550s. During the second half of the
seventeenth century, the positive check resumed its secular decline although the
variation across parishes rose substantially compared with earlier periods, with
a subset of parishes continuing to experience a substantial positive check until
1800.
Also notable in Figure 6 is how much the strength of the positive check
in individual parishes varied through time in early periods: individual lines
frequently cross, so that parishes with a strong positive check in one period have
a weak positive check in the next. The correlation between the positive checks
in 1540–1600 and 1601–1650 is 0.3, and between 1540–1600 and 1651–1700 is
0. What is not evident in Figure 6, due to the jump in the early eighteenth
century, is that the strength of the positive check is strongly correlated between
the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries, with a correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.8.
Figure 7 maps the strength of the positive check in each parish, assigning
it to three categories (for the late sixteenth century, parishes fall into two clear
clusters as Figure 6 shows, so we group by these two clusters). It can be seen
that the strength of the positive check goes from being geographically random
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to showing a strong spatial
trend from south-east to northwest in the eighteenth. The ﬁnal panel shows
Poor Law expenditure in 1784 relative to parish population in 1811, and the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Strength of positive check by half century, and Poor Law spending in
1784. Red circles denote the strongest positive check or lowest spending, blue
trianges denote the weakest positive check or highest spending.
4.2 London and Paris
Our London data start in 1647. They are taken from the Bills of Mortality which
tracked numbers and causes of deaths as a way to monitor plague outbreaks;
while Paris data, based on parish records of funerals, run from 1551 to 1788,
with a gap between 1726 and 1739. We graph estimated crude death rates
for both cities (London population comes from interpolating Wrigley’s 1967
estimates, and Paris population from interpolating Biraben and Blanchet 1999).




































































































































Figure 8: Deaths per thousand in London (1647–1810) and Paris (1550–1788).
spikes are associated with political turbulence: the siege of Paris in 1590, and
the Fronde in 1652.6
Table 3 gives the results of a regression of death rates on lagged deaths rates
and real wages, using Allen’s real wage series for London and Paris. All series
again are ﬁrst diﬀerences of logs.
Early observations for London are volatile and exert high leverage on re-
gressions. We therefore begin the reported regressions in 1653. It can be seen
that lagged real wages aﬀect mortality with an elasticity of −0.4 before 1700
(signiﬁcant at 8 per cent), and −0.5 before 1750, but wages have no impact on
mortality after 1750. The pattern of London mortality diﬀers substantially from
the rest of England. During the late seventeenth century when, as Table 2 and
Figure 7 show, the positive check had waned in most places and especially in
the area around London, it remained substantial in London. The positive check
persisted in London despite higher real wages than in the rest of England: build-
ing labourers in London earned between 1.5 and 2 times as much as in Oxford
(Allen, 2007). Similarly, although London did not experience the same crisis
mortality as the rest of England during the 1720s and 1740s (compare Figures
6It is notable that the average annual death rate in Paris is not substantially higher than
in London, although this may represent worse under-enumeration of infant deaths: whereas
in London funerals usually exceed baptisms by around one third—in keeping with the idea of
pre-industrial cities as demographic sinks—in most years the number of recorded baptisms in
Paris exceeds the number of funerals. The low death rates for London in the late eighteenth
century may be due to a more casual recording of deaths as the threat of plague waned, but
may reﬂect the large numbers of young adults working there as servants, who had lower death
rates than the general population: Davenport, Boulton and Schwarz (2010).
19London Paris
1700 1750 1800 1600 1650 1725 1789
wage −0.25 0.089 −0.249 −1.07∗∗ −0.154 −0.746∗∗ −0.485∗
(0.202) (0.192) (0.205) (0.34) (0.336) (0.195) (0.205)
lag.wage −0.375 −0.485∗ 0.225 −0.211 0.019 −0.478∗ 0.008
(0.206) (0.198) (0.226) (0.39) (0.35) (0.213) (0.215)
lag2.wage −0.145 −0.208 0.402 0.688 −0.246 −0.195 −0.216
(0.208) (0.209) (0.221) (0.402) (0.341) (0.218) (0.206)
lag3.wage 0.046 −0.262 0.328 0.367 0.152 −0.308 0.021
(0.218) (0.203) (0.243) (0.38) (0.33) (0.206) (0.186)
lag.death −0.246∗ −0.496∗∗ −0.475∗∗ −0.683∗∗ −0.519∗∗ −0.48∗∗ −0.029
(0.101) (0.146) (0.156) (0.152) (0.15) (0.119) (0.165)
lag2.death −0.055 −0.475∗∗ −0.194 −0.149 −0.26 −0.238 −0.51∗∗
(0.093) (0.149) (0.164) (0.17) (0.159) (0.131) (0.155)
lag3.death 0.034 −0.254 −0.031 −0.139 −0.25 −0.123 −0.073
(0.065) (0.138) (0.153) (0.143) (0.142) (0.123) (0.157)
d1665 1.728∗∗ . . . . . .
(0.137)
d1666 −1.566∗∗ . . . . . .
(0.221)
N 47 49 50 46 50 75 43
RMSE 0.12 0.097 0.092 0.382 0.228 0.244 0.078
R2 0.929 0.366 0.282 0.543 0.26 0.342 0.387
Impact of living standards and past mortality on total deaths for London and Paris. All
variables are diﬀerences of logs, standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at 5
percent, ** at 1 percent.
Table 3: Living standards and mortality in London and Paris.
5 and 8), its positive check remained as strong as during the late-seventeenth
century.
Paris, where real wages were as low as in early fourteenth century London,
shows a diﬀerent pattern of mortality with falls in real wages causing immediate
rises in mortality just as we found among medieval tenants. The positive check
weakened through time but still remaining substantial until the Revolution, in-
stead of disappearing in the mid-eighteenth century as in England. The absence
of a positive check in the early seventeenth century is puzzling and is not caused
by outliers in the data, but if these data are added to the previous or succeeding
half-centuries, they continue to show strong positive checks.
5 What Had Changed?
We have seen that, during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and
from the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, a strong connection existed
in England between falling real wages one year, and increased mortality the
20next.7 We found that this positive check moderated after the mid-seventeenth
century, except for London where falling wages caused increased mortality for
another century. What stopped bad harvests killing English people on a large
scale? We consider four possible factors: higher real wages; reduced variance
of grain supply; increased urbanization; and changing climate. We then go
on to consider the possible role of institutions, namely improved public health
measures and the Old Poor Law.
First real wages. Figure 3 shows that, while real wages were low before the
Black Death, they were actually higher in the late sixteenth century than a
century later when the positive check had disappeared. While average living
standards in England were high by contemporary standards, about one ﬁfth of
the population in the late seventeenth century lived at the edge of biological
survival. Moreover, if the disappearance of the positive check in this period
were simply due to rising living standards, we would expect that the positive
check would be weaker in London than in the rest of England, because wages
were higher there. Instead, we have seen how the positive check persisted in
London after it had disappeared elsewhere.
That living standards were not suﬃcient of themselves to eliminate the pos-
itive check is not to deny that they did play a large role. It was only because
England was a relatively prosperous place that it was able to aﬀord a generous
system of public charity: had living standards been as low as in France, the
English Poor Law would probably have been unaﬀordable.
Next we consider the possibility that reduced mortality was the result of
a better functioning grain market. While the standard deviation of annual
percentage changes in wheat prices does fall after 1600 in response to better
market integration and improved storage techniques, price changes retained a
strong predictable component consistent with inﬂexible supply, and their vari-
ance was still substantial.8 In half the years in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries wheat price changed by over 10 per cent, and in one ﬁfth by over 20
per cent.
7In an earlier version of this paper we analyzed a large sample of wills from 1430 to 1480
compiled by Gottfried (1978), but found that deaths bore little relation to living standards
(which were uniquely high at this time as Figure 3 shows) but were driven by exogenous
recurrences of plague.
8The standard deviation from 1261 to 1600 is 28.5%, compared with 18.3% from 1601 to
1800. Price changes retained a strong predictable component, the correlation between price
changes two and three years apart being −0.25 and −0.20 respectively, with little diﬀerence
before or after 1600.
21The next possible factor in reduced mortality is increased urbanization and
market activity. However, probably the same fraction of the population, around
6 per cent, lived in towns of over 10,000 in 1300 as in 1600 (Campbell, 2000,
405). Moreover, greater integration into markets tended to increase vulnerability
to poor harvests. As Walter (1989) shows, subsistence agriculture provided
considerable insulation against steep rises in food prices, that was lost when
regions began to specialize in producing one good and import grain, so that the
worst mortality crises of the early seventeenth century tended to occur in such
proto-industrializing areas.
Finally, lowered mortality might be the consequence of climatic change.
However, Kelly and Ó Gráda (2010) ﬁnd that conventional stories of a Lit-
tle Ice Age are a statistical artefact arising from the practice in climatology
of smoothing data prior to analysis, and that unsmoothed annual temperature
and rainfall reconstructions across western Europe between 1300 and 1900 show
almost no autocorrelation: climate appears constant.
5.1 The Old Poor Law.
Given that rising living standards, reduced harvest volatility, increased urban-
ization, and better climate have limited power to explain the weakening positive
check between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, we consider the possible
impact of a central institution of English society before the industrial revolution:
the Poor Law.
Before twentieth century advances in public health, starvation-induced mor-
tality was not an individual fate. Instead, after bad harvests, the poor migrated
in search of work or charity, spreading disease and social disorder ranging from
petty crime to armed rebellion.9 Apart from the dictates of religion (whose
central place in people’s lives at this time should not be overlooked) and pater-
nalistic ideology, the ruling class had strong practical incentives to mitigate the
impact of harvest failures on the poor.
In medieval times the main sources of charity were monasteries. While the
amounts disbursed appear to have been substantial (Rushton and Sigle-Rushton
2001, Slack 1989, 13), they were given to a fairly ﬁxed group of permanent
9For the eighteenth century, Galloway (1985) found that deaths of young adults in London
rose in the aftermath of poor harvests, reﬂecting an inﬂux of the unemployed from surrounding
areas. Lawson (1986) shows, for the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, that
prosecutions for property crime rose after bad harvests. During the sixteenth century, disorder
ranging from food riots to armed insurrection occurred after harvest failures (Leonard, 1900,
303).
22dependents. Large religious institutions typically devoted the income or produce
from one manor to charitable purposes, which meant that after a poor harvest,
the amount available for distribution fell as demand rose.
Historians see the beginning of a concern with public charity in the mid-
sixteenth century, as population pressure drove down real wages (see Figure
3). Central government response took two main practical forms: punishing
vagrants, and regulating grain markets in years of poor harvests through so-
called Books of Orders. These prohibited exports, restricted grain movements,
and allowed magistrates to inspect grain stores (Leonard 1900, 61–66, Slack
1989, 113–137, Fogel 1992). However, at this time local charity was probably
more important: both private, where wealthy individuals endowed institutions;
and municipal, where local governments distributed subsidized grain or gave
money directly to poor families (Walter, 1989).
What distinguished England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was its comprehensive, national system of outdoor poor relief funded by local
property taxes. While sixteenth century parliaments routinely passed laws to
enact such a system, culminating in the Vagrancy and Poor Relief Statutes of
1598, the government only began actively to force parishes to implement poor
relief in the 1620s. At this time the state developed a short and eﬀective chain
of administration from the King’s Privy Council, through local grandees acting
as county magistrates, to prosperous farmers acting as village constables. This
led most of the more populous parishes to implement a system of poor rates
to subsidies local families in need of assistance. Most charity went to those in
permanent need: the elderly, the disabled, and widowed or deserted mothers of
small children; with some aid going to families in temporary need because of
illness, unemployment, or high food prices. Another facet of increasing state
activism was aggressive action against epidemic disease, to which Slack (1981)
attributes the disappearance of plague in the 1660s.10
This system was already suﬃciently well entrenched by the 1640s to continue
operating through the Civil Wars. By the end of the seventeenth century, Poor
Law expenditure was about 1 per cent of national income, suﬃcient to provide
complete subsistence for 5 per cent of the population; and increased to around 2
per cent of national income by the end of the eighteenth century (Slack, 1989).
For comparison, O’Brien (1988) estimates that central government taxation
10The timing of the disappearance of plague listed by Slack (1981) give an index of govern-
mental eﬀectiveness: England in 1660s, France in the 1730s, Moscow in the 1770s, and the
Balkans in 1840s.
23equalled around 3.5 per cent of national income in the 1670s and 1680s, rising
to 9 per cent in the 1690s, and 12 per cent by 1790.
Was this expenditure eﬀective? Slack (1989, 207) concludes that after 1620
the system worked to minimize outright starvation. In other words it probably
worked to keep the numbers of destitute people below a critical threshold needed
for epidemic disease to spread through the general population, something that
was aided by the prohibitions against vagrancy, and the insistence that aid
would only be oﬀered in one’s home parish. It is notable that the reduction
of the positive check from the early seventeenth century coincides with the
emergence of a national system of poor relief at this time.
The eﬀectiveness and limitations of Poor Relief are shown in Figure 5 which
shows, after the mid-seventeenth century, the weakening link between harvest
failure and crisis mortality. In particular, deaths do not rise in 1647, the 1690s,
1709 and 1800 despite sharp rises in wheat prices. However, it is equally appar-
ent that public charity could be overwhelmed when poor harvests were accom-
panied by epidemic illness that left large fractions of the population too ill to
work, of the sort that occurred in 1740–42 and, especially, 1728–30.
While most of England introduced systematic poor relief based on parish
rates and monetary payments in the second quarter of the seventeenth century,
the great exception was London. Serious eﬀorts at public charity only began in
London under the new Hanoverian monarchy in the 1720s, and took a diﬀer-
ent form than the rest of England, being centred on hospital and workhouses
(Boulton and Schwartz, 2010). Most discussions of mortality decline in the late-
eighteenth century focus on infectious disease, especially smallpox. However,
Davenport, Boulton and Schwarz (2010) ﬁnd that most of the improvement in
London mortality occurred among infants under 6 months (between the 1740s
and the 1840s infant mortality in London declined from around 350 per thou-
sand to the national average of 160), a group whose death rate from infectious
disease was low, something that is consistent with improving maternal health
and infant nutrition resulting from public charity.
5.2 Determinants of the Positive Check.
What determined the strength of the positive check in diﬀerent parishes? We
have some information on parish characteristics from the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries compiled by Schoﬁeld (1998): type of farming; pop-
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Figure 9: Determinants of positive check in parishes during the eighteenth cen-
tury.
and whether their support was satisfactory or not in 1818; taxable value for
1524 and 1832; and employment by sector for 1831. We also have Hunt’s (1986)
estimates of agricultural wages by county for 1767–1770.
We wish to see how well these variables predict the strength of the posi-
tive check across parishes during the ﬁrst and second halves of the eighteenth
century. Because most potential explanatory variables refer to later periods,
our results rely on the assumption that local variables remained fairly constant
through time, and must necessarily be tentative. All variables involving total
expenditures, tax value, and employment structure are divided by 1811 popu-
lation.
To determine the pattern of positive check we use a classiﬁcation tree ap-
proach, using the unbiased recursive partitioning framework of Hothorn, Hornik
and Zeileis (2006). This is a two step procedure where the covariate with the
highest association with the dependent variable (based on a Strasser-Weber
permutation test) is chosen, and this covariate is then split to maximize the
diﬀerence between the dependent variable in the two subsets. The procedure
continues until the p-value of the test for independence between the dependent
variable and the covariates, reported at each node, falls below 5 per cent.
Figure 9(a) shows that for the crisis period of the early eighteenth century,
the strongest predictor of the positive check in a parish are county wages, with
25low wage areas having a stronger reaction of mortality to real wage changes. For
higher wage area we see that the amount of poor relief in 1784 also mattered,
with areas with low levels of poor relief having a positive check as strong as low
wage areas, with parishes with more generous poor relief suﬀering the lowest
impact.
For the late eighteenth century when, as Figure 6 shows, the positive check
had disappeared in most areas, the main predictor is the size of manufacturing
employment, with areas of high manufacturing employment still experiencing a
strong positive check indicating a greater impact of food prices than in food pro-
ducing areas. In areas with less manufacturing, having a large poor population
led to a higher positive check.
6 Conclusions.
To Laslett’s (1965) famous question “Did the peasants really starve?”, the cur-
rent answer is a fairly unambiguous “No”. However, while numerous earlier
studies have noted that bad harvests after the mid-seventeenth century tended
not to kill many English people, this paper asked why. Constructing new series
of mortality among tenants and nobility in the century before the Black Death,
we found that bad harvests in this period were deadly at all levels of society.
Similarly, while rises in food prices ceased to cause widespread mortality after
the mid-seventeenth century (although there is a serious reversal in the early
eighteenth century) despite falling real wages, we found that the positive check
persisted in London for another century, despite wages there that over ﬁfty per
cent higher than elsewhere. This leads us to suggest that the disappearance of
the positive check in England was not simply a reﬂection of living standards,
but also the result of deliberate public charity, that emerged in rural England
in the mid-seventeenth century and in London a century later.
Appendix: Data Sources and Estimation
• Crop yield data are from Campbell (2007): http://www.cropyields.ac.uk.
• Entry ﬁnes on the Winchester manors are from M. Page, “Peasant Land
Market in Southern England, 1260-1350” available from http://ahds.ac.uk/
catalogue/collection.htm?uri=hist-4086-1.
26• Annual numbers of IPMs from 1300 to 1349 from Campbell (2005) were
provided by the author.
• Annual numbers of wills in the Diocese of Norwich from 1430 to 1480 were
calculated from Graph 4.1.1 in Gottfried (1978).
• Real wages of agricultural labourers are taken from Clark (2007b). Real
wages in London and Paris are taken from Robert Allen’s database of
Prices and Wages. (http://www.nuﬃeld.ox.ac.uk/General/Members/allen.aspx).
• Vital rates per 1,000 population from 1541 to 1870 are from Wrigley and
Schoﬁeld (1981) Table A3.1. In estimating crude death rates in Figure 5,
London population is interpolated from Wrigley’s (1967) estimates, and
Paris population and funerals are from Biraben and Blanchet (1999).
• London deaths from the Bills of Mortality are taken from Marshall (1832).
• Parish Poorlaw expenditure in 1784, mortality and population are from
Schoﬁeld (1998).
• Estimation was carried out in R. Panel regressions were estimated using
the lme4 module, coeﬃcient stability using the strucchange module, and
sensitivity to outliers using the forward module.
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